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THE EFFECT OF AN ACCUSED'S INTEREST ON
HIS CREDITABILITY AS A WITNESS
Under the English Common Law, a defendant in a criminal pro-
ceeding was deemed incompetent to testify on his own behalf.1
This Common Law practice resulted from the belief that the frail-
ties of human nature, coupled with an overpowering desire for
freedom, would ordinarily induce a defendant to falsify his testi-
mony.2 Today, however, a defendant's incompetency to testify has
been abrogated in all jurisdictions by statuteY A federal statute
also provides that a defendant's failure to testify cannot be used
against him.
4
The Supreme Court of the United States in Griffin v. United
States,6 has ruled that the fifth amendment forbids an instruction
by a court that a defendant's silence is evidence of guilt. In a ma-
jority of the federal and state courts which allow the defendant
to testify, however, the trial judge is allowed to instruct the jury
that the defendant has an interest in the outcome of the case.8
The defendant's interest, under the majority view, is permitted to
be considered in determining the credibility of the defendant as a
witness. A defendant's testimony can be singled out by the trial
judge in his instruction to the jury. The effect of such an instruc-
tion is to imply that the defendant's interest in the result would
tempt him to be untruthful. The instruction has been upheld,
however, on the theory that an accused is not entitled to have his
evidence regarded as the evidence of a disinterested witness.7
1. See Lake Shore National Bank v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 83 F.
Supp. 795 (D.D.C. 1949).
2. State v. Wilcox, 206 N.C. 692, 693, 175 S.E. 122, 123 (1934).
3. See 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 575 (3d ed. 1940).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1964) provides:In trial of all persons charged with the commission of of-
fenses against the United States the person charged shall, at his
own request, be a competent witness. His failure to make such a
request shall not create any presumptions against him.
5. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
6. United States v. Mahler, 363 F.2d 673, 678 (2d Cir. 1966); Caldwell
v. United States, 338 F.2d 385, 392 (8th Cir. 1964); State v. Sullivan, 4
Conn. Cir. 578, 236 A.2d 721 (1967); People v. Woitches, 290 Ill. App. 402, 8
N.E.2d 687 (1937); State v. Sandore, 100 N.J.L. 187, 124 A. 528 (1924); State
v. Quartier, 718 Ore. 637, 247 P. 783 (1926).
7. State v. Sullivan, 4 Conn. Cir. 578, 236 A.2d 721 (1967) (an in-
struction on defendants interest and his motives for not telling the truth
was upheld).
It has been argued that since judicial comment on a defendant's
credibility has the effect of discrediting the defendant's testimony,
such comment denies him a fair trial.8 It has also been argued
that such comment violates a defendant's constitutional rights un-
der the fifth amendment.9
This Comment will examine the propriety of a jury instruc-
tion concerning the effect of a defendant's interest in the case on
the credibility of his testimony. The majority of the federal and
the state courts allow the judge, in his instruction to the jury, to
comment on the possible effect on the defendant's credibility of
his interest in the outcome of the case. 10 However, the minority
rule, which seems to be the modern trend, states that the defendant
should not be singled out and made the object of specific com-
ment." It is argued that the testimony of the accused should be
considered in the same manner as that of other witnesses, and a
single instruction concerning all witnesses should be given.12 An
examination of the cases in this area of jury instructions as to
defendant's interest will reveal the strengths and weaknesses of
both views.
MAJORITY RULE
The majority rule is that it is proper for the trial judge to
give the jury an instruction concerning the defendant's interest
in the outcome of the case. 1" In 1895 the United States Supreme
Court, in the case of Reagan v. United States, upheld a jury in-
struction which directed the jury to consider the defendant's di-
rect personal interest in the result of the case ". . . where the
temptation is strong to color or withhold the facts. ' 14  The
Reagan decision is frequently cited as well-established authority for
the proposition that a trial judge may comment on a defendant's
interest.15
8. E.g., State v. Bester, Iowa ,167 N.W.2d 705 (1969).
9. Id.
10. See Annot., 85 A.L.R. 523 (1933).
11. E.g., Erickson v. State, 14 Ariz. 253, 127 P. 754 (1912).
12. An instruction that the defendant is a competent witness and that
the jury is to consider the testimony of all the witnesses including the de-
fendant would seem to be sufficient.
13. Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301 (1895); United States v.
McCarthy, 295 F.2d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 1961); Stapleton v. United States,
260 F.2d 415, 420 (9th Cir. 1958); People v. Casey, 350 Ill. 522, 183 N.E. 616
(1932); Commonwealth v. Loomis, 267 Pa. 438, 110 A. 257 (1920); see
cases cited note 6 supra.
14. Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 304 (1895).
15. Taylor v. United States, 390 F.2d 278, 284 (8th Cir. 1968); Rimer-
man v. United States, 374 F.2d 251, 254 (8th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Mahler, 363 F.2d 673, 678 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Sullivan, 329 F.2d
755, 757 (2d Cir. 1964); Caldwell v. United States, 338 F.2d 385, 392 (8th Cir.
1964); Foley v. United States, 290 F.2d 562, 569 (8th Cir. 1961); United
States v. Paccione, 224 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1955); Bridges v. United States,
199 F.2d 811, 832 (9th Cir. 1952).
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The court in United States v. Sullivan' upheld a jury in-
struction on the basis that its propriety had been established in
Reagan.1 7 The court felt that an instruction may point out the
defendant's special interest in the case and went on to say that an
instruction of this nature was not error because it did not mislead
the jury.'
The eighth circuit upheld a charge which stated that the jury
was bound to consider the vital interest of a defendant in deter-
mining his credibility.1 9 The court reasoned that although the
reference made in regard to defendant's credibility was coupled
with a comment on his interest, it was not objectionable because




Challenged instructions concerning the defendant's interest
have taken many forms. In some cases the trial judge simply
referred to ". . . the interest of defendant in the case. '21 Other
cases have gone further and emphasized the ". . . very vital in-
terest"22 or the ". . . very grave interest of the defendant in the
case."'23 The language of the instructions may differ but the courts
are in agreement that a reference to defendant's interest is proper.
24
In Malofsky v. United States25 the jury was instructed that
simply because the defendant had an interest, it did not follow
that he was incapable of telling a truthful story. Defendant
challenged this charge claiming that his testimony had been preju-
diced by the adverse comments of the judge. Defendant further
argued that the instruction indicated that he had an interest
which would lead him to fabricate his story. The court, in up-
holding the charge, stated that the propriety of such a charge is
16. 329 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1964).
17. Id. at 757, where the instruction stated:
You know that, of course, the defendant is interested-vitally in-
terested-in the outcome of a case, his case. That is not to say
anyone who is interested in the case necessarily lies, but it is a fact
you must take into consideration.
18. Id.
19. Caldwell v. United States, 338 F.2d 385, 392 (8th Cir. 1964). See
also Black v. United States, 309 F.2d 331 (8th Cir. 1962); Rizzo v. United
States, 295 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1961).
20. Caldwell v. United States, 338 F.2d 385, 392 (8th Cir. 1964).
21. Rimerman v. United States, 374 F.2d 251, 255 (8th Cir. 1967).
22. Foley v. United States, 290 F.2d 562, 569 (8th Cir. 1961).
23. Taylor v. United States, 390 F.2d 278, 284 (8th Cir. 1968).
24. E.g., Caldwell v. United States, 338 F.2d 385, 392 (8th Cir. 1964).
But see Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442, 452 (1893). Here the Court
reversed, holding the instruction constituted error.
25. 293 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
well-established by Reagan and other federal decisions.2 6
Although the majority rule is engrained in the federal court
system, there are signs of a growing dissatisfaction with the rule.
In Taylor v. United States2 7 the instruction referred to the "...
very grave interest a defendant has in the case.
' 28 The defendant
argued that the charge violated the federal statute which em-
powered him to be a competent witness, and that it suggested that
he would commit perjury. These two factors combined to defeat
the purpose for which he had taken the stand. Although the court
upheld the instruction because of precedent, it expressed the opin-
ion that such an instruction was unnecessary because its effect is
to leave the defense counsel with a troubled mind, and thus en-
courage appeals. The court felt that a defendant should not be
singled out in an instruction by the trial judge because an ac-
cused's interest is obvious to the jury.29 The court even went so
far as to recommend a general instruction that would be acceptable
in this type of situation.
3 0
Today, all states have statutes allowing a defendant to be a
competent witness on his own behalf.3 ' Some state statutes allow
comment on the defendant's interest.3 2  Other statutes forbid any
comment which is directed solely at the defendant's testimony.33
The individual state statutes will not be examined; however this
Comment will examine some of the state decisions which, like the
federal courts, allow comment on the defendant's interest in the
outcome of the case.3 4 It should be noted that the leading cases in
26. Id. at 1123.
27. 390 F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1968).
28. Id. at 284.
29. Id. at 285.
30. A defendant who wishes to testify, however, is a competent
witness, and the defendant's testimony is to be judged in the same way as
that of any other witness. Id. (citing W. MATHES, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE
AND INSTRUCTIONS § 9.12 (1965) ).
31. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 1691 (1942):
The accused shall be a competent witness for himself in any
prosecution against him, but the failure of the accused to testify,
shall not operate to his prejudice or be commented upon.
For other examples see, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.2201 (1962); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 43-2016 (1947); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3501 (1953); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 1.250 (1968); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 155-1 (1937); MINN.
STAT. § 595.02 (1945); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:81-8 (1951); TEX. CODE CRaM.
PROc. art. 38.08 (1965); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-244 (1957).
32. E.g., MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-8803 (1921):
[T]he jury in judging his credibility and weight to be given
to his testimony may take into consideration the fact that he is a
defendant and the nature and enormity of the crime of which he
is accused.
33. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.171 (1967):
[T]he credit to be given his testimony being left solely to the
jury, under instructions of the court, but no special instruction to
be given relating exclusively to the testimony of the defendant.
34. See State v. Killion, 95 Kan. 371, 148 P. 643 (1915); People v.
Wudorski, 253 Mich. 83, 234 N.W. 157 (1931); State v. Greiner, 53 N.D. 558,
207 N.W. 226 (1926).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
this area are older cases which are followed without much dis-
cussion. These courts apparently permit a separate instruction
concerning defendant's testimony because they feel such evidence
should not be treated the same as testimony of a disinterested
witness.3 5
An early Pennsylvania decision, which is still cited as au-
thority, held that the trial judge had a duty to give an instruction
pertaining to defendant's interest in the case.36 Another Pennsyl-
vania case upheld an instruction which intimated that a defendant
would not speak the truth because he was the accused.3 7 These de-
cisions place reliance on the reasoning that the accused, because of
his interest, will falsify his testimony.
State courts have approved such diverse instructions as:
". you have a right to consider the interest,"3 8 "the interest of a
witness is always to be considered . . .,"0 ". . consider the great
interest in the result . . . and the temptation which arises to color
or distort -,40 and "... above all you are to take into considera-
tion that he is the accused and has a great interest in the result of
same." 41  The courts have made some fine distinctions in cases
where the instruction contained the words "must consider" as
opposed to "may consider."4 2  An instruction that the jury must
consider the defendant's interest when weighing accused's credi-
bility has been held to be an invasion of the province of the jury4 3
Although most state courts claim to be bound by the prece-
dents in their jurisdictions, a few courts have admitted that in-
structions concerning a defendant's interest may be somewhat
prejudicial. These courts will, however, usually look to another
part of the instruction in order to cure the error.44 Other courts
hold that a comment on defendant's interest, although error, is
merely harmless error.4
5
35. State v. Sullivan, 4 Conn. Cir. 578, 236 A.2d 721 (1967).
36. Commonwealth v. Orr, 138 Pa. 276, 20 A. 866 (1890).
37. Commonwealth v. Brounfeldt, 72 Pa. Super. 25 (1919).
38. Davis v. State, 171 Neb. 333, 337, 106 N.W.2d 490, 496 (1960).
39. People v. Gerdvine, 210 N.Y. 184, 104 N.E. 129 (1914). But see
People v. Curatola, 184 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1959); People v. Flynn, 89 N.Y.S.2d
28 (1949).
40. State v. Henderson, 226 Wis. 154, 157, 274 N.W. 266, 269 (1937).
41. State v. Schleifer, 102 Conn. 708, 716, 130 A. 184, 192 (1925).
42. Miller v. State, 21 Ala. App. 203, 107 So. 721 (1926); State v. Dot-
son, 26 Mont. 305, 67 P. 938 (1902); Younger v. State, 12 Wyo. 24, 73 P.
551 (1903).
43. E.g., State v. Dotson, 26 Mont. 305, 67 P. 938 (1902).
44. State v. Henderson, 226 Wis. 154, 157, 274 N.W. 266, 269 (1937)
(wherein a supplemental instruction cured the initial error).
45. See State v. Fitch, 65 Nev. 668, 679, 200 P.2d 991, 1003 (1948)
Nevertheless, there are some instructions that are so preju-
dicial that there is no possible cure, and the court must reverse the
conviction. In Holmes v. State46 the charge read, ". . . as a general
rule the witness who is interested in the result of the suit will not
be as honest, candid, and fair in his testimony as one who is not
interested. '47 The court felt that the effect of this charge was to
say that the witness lied and that his testimony should be disre-
garded. Had the instruction read ". . . above all, you are to con-
sider the fact that he is the accused and that he is greatly interested
in the result," it would probably have been approved.
48
Another charge stated ". . consider that he is the defendant
charged with this offense, and that he is likely to give such testi-
mony as will most likely result in his acquittal. '49  A Michigan
court ruled that this prejudicial statement was harmless error
because another part of the instruction had cured the defect.50
Some cases have gone so far as to uphold a comment to the effect
that the defendant had ". . . an interest in the result of the
prosecution and that they should give his testimony such weight
as they thought it entitled to and no more.51  In affirming this
instruction, the court based its reasoning on the theory that there
was no prejudice because the jurors were aware of the defendant's
interest in the case. There seems to be, however, little difference
between these two instructions and the one in the Holmes case.
Thus, the majority rule is an entrenched doctrine based on the
theory that a defendant, because of his interest in the case, is
less likely to testify truthfully than are other witnesses. Since
the accused is interested in the outcome of the case, it is believed
that it is proper for the trial judge to call the jury's attention to
his interest which is different from that of any other witness.
The trial judge wants to make certain that the jurors do not
forget the accused's special position in the case.
MINoRrY RULE
In Hicks v. United States5 2 the United States Supreme Court
(a state statute forbid this type of comment).
46. 85 Neb. 506, 123 N.W. 1043 (1909).
47. Id. at 1044.
48. State v. Schleifer, 102 Conn. 708, 716, 130 A. 184, 192 (1925).
49. People v. Wassmus, 214 Mich. 42, 43, 182 N.W. 66, 67 (1921) (the
court said it would have been better if such language had been omitted;
however, they felt that defendant's interests were not prejudiced by such a
statement).
50. People v. Wassmus, 214 Mich. 42, 182 N.W. 66 (1921). The court
stated:
I . . [B]ut notwithstanding that, you should weigh his testimony
carefully, just as you should weigh the testimony of all witnesses
in every case carefully, with an endeavor to arrive at what the
true facts are; after all, gentlemen of the jury, you men must find
the facts that have been proven by the evidence.
Id. at 43, 182 N.W. at 67.
51. E.g., People v. Cash, 326 IL. 104, 108, 157 N.E. 76, 80 (1927).
52. 150 U.S. 442 (1893).
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reversed a conviction based on an instruction which distinguished
".. . between statements of the accused and statements of other
witnesses who are telling the truth."5 3  The Court stated the
privilege given a defendant to testify would be valueless if the
testimony of the defendant were to be the object of such adverse
comment by the trial judge.54 The prejudice that results from a
comment on defendant's interest is one of the primary reasons why
a minority of states forbids such comment.
In a minority of jurisdictions the interest of a defendant in
the outcome of the case may not be made the object of specific
comment, and such comment is held to be prejudicial error.
55
There are many reasons advanced for the validity of this rule. In
some states the constitutions do not allow the court to comment on
matters of fact and direct the courts to limit their instructions to
matters of law.56 Other courts declare that it is the jury's function
to determine the credibility of all witnesses including the ac-
cused.57 Some courts have also rejected instructions which do not
treat the defendant in the same manner as the other witnesses
who have testified.58
53. Id. at 450 (emphasis added).
54. The Court stated:
Still it must be remembered that men testify truthfully, al-
though their lives hang in the balance, and that the law, in its wis-
dom, has provided that the accused shall have the right to testify
in his own behalf. Such a privilege would be a vain one if the
judge, to whose lightest word the jury, properly enough, gave a
great weight, should intimate that the dreadful condition in which
the accused finds himself should deprive his testimony of prob-
ability.
Id.
55. See Annot., 85 A.L.R. 523 (1933). Arizona, California, Idaho,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Caro-
lina and Texas are listed as following the minority rule. Id. at 578.
56. See Erickson v. State, 14 Ariz. 253, 257, 127 P. 754, 757 (1912).
A section of the Arizona Constitution provided: "Judges shall not charge
juries with respect to matters of fact nor comment thereon, but shall de-
clare the law." ARiz. CONST. art. 6, § 12. See also State v. Miller, 62 Ariz.
529, 158 P.2d 669 (1945).
57. Wright v. Commonwealth, 85 Ky. 123, 2 S.W. 904 (1887) (the
court felt the trial judge had no right to direct attention of the jury to any
witness because the jury is the sole judge of credibility).
58. Fletcher v. State, 200 Okla. 300, 101 P. 599 (1909), where the
court said:
We think that it was error for the court to single out any special
witness [defendant] personally and burden his testimony with any
suggestions which might indicate to the jury that, in the opinion
of the court such witness was liable to testify fal.zely.
Id. at 308, 101 P. at 608. See also Hughes v. State, 30 Okla. Crim. 387, 106
P. 546 (1910); Banks v. States, 20 Okla. Crim. 339, 101 P. 610 (1909).
A Louisiana decision5" held it reversible error to instruct the
jury to take into consideration the interest of defendant in the
result of the trial. The court stated that a specific instruction
concerning defendant's testimony was prejudicial in that it inti-
mated that the interest the defendant had in the outcome of the
case would encourage him to hide the truth. Similar instructions
in the case of Muely v. State ° were held reversible as an invasion
of the province of the jury.
One of the leading cases6 1 in this area reversed the lower
court holding because the jury instruction included a specific ref-
erence to the defendant's interest in the outcome of the case.
The court stated that such an instruction was unnecessary because:
There is little danger that juries will be unduly in-
fluenced by the testimony of defendants in criminal cases.
They do not need any cautioning against too ready cre-
dence to the exculpation furnished by one on trial for a
felony. The accused should be allowed to testify unim-
paired by any suggestions calculated to detract from its
value in the estimation of the jury.
62
In Adler v. State6 3 the court condemned an instruction by the
trial judge which singled out the defendant as a witness and
commented on his interest in the result of the case. The instruc-
tion was deemed reversible error in that it had the effect of treating
the defendant's testimony in a manner different from that of other
witnesses. A similar instruction in Scheerer v. State6 4 was also
held to be reversible error because of the adverse effect that an
instruction of this nature has upon the defendant's testimony.
Graves v. State,65 a Nevada decision, involved a defendant who
was convicted of first degree murder. The defendant was his
own sole witness. The trial judge gave the following instruction:
You should consider his relation and situation under
which he gives testimony, the consequences to him relating
from the result of the trial, and all the inducements and
temptations which would ordinarily influence a person in
59. State v. Carrol, 134 La. 965, 64 So. 868 (1914). See also State v.
Newman, 157 La. 564, 102 So. 671 (1925); State v. Hataway, 144 La. 138, 80
So. 227 (1918); State v. Smith, 135 La. 427, 65 So. 598 (1914); State v. King,
135 La. 117, 64 So. 1007 (1914).
60. 31 Tex. Crim. 155, 19 S.W. 915 (1892).
61. Buckley v. State, 62 Miss. 705 (1885).
62. Id. at 705 (1885). See also Phillips v. State, 196 So. 2d 363
(Miss. 1967); Hall v. State, 250 Miss. 253, 265, 165 So. 2d 345, 351 (1964);
Jones v. State, 154 Miss. 640, 122 So. 760 (1929); Rigott v. State, 107 Miss.
552, 65 So. 583 (1914).
63. 239 Ind. 68, 154 N.E.2d 716 (1958), where the court said: "... you
have the right to consider his interest in weighing his testimony the same
as you would consider the interest of any other witness having a like de-
gree of interest in the outcome." Id. at 69, 154 N.E.2d 717 (emphasis
added).
64. 197 Ind. 155, 149 N.E. 892 (1925). See also People v. Washing-
ton, 327 Ill. 152, 158 N.E. 386, 388 (1927).
65. 82 Nev. 137, 413 P.2d 503 (1966).
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his situation. You should carefully determine the amount
of credibility to which his evidence is entitled.
66
Nevada had a statute which rendered the giving of such an instruc-
tion reversible error.6 7 However, the court was of the opinion that
such a determination was solely within the purview of the courts.,
Nevertheless, the court declared that the instruction as given
constituted reversible error. It stated that the instruction was so
prejudicial as to be offensive to the court's sense of justice.69
The court felt the legislative intent behind the statute was to save
a defendant from the prejudice such an instruction would produce.
Since the legislature had no power to intervene in the judicial area,
it was necessary for the court, which is the proper body to deter-
mine what constitutes reversible error, to rule the instruction re-
versible error. It seems that the court went out of its way to
condemn this instruction because of the great prejudice it pro-
duced.
Other cases have been complicated by the defendant having
more than one interest in the outcome of the case. In Prendergraft
v. State70 the defendant was accused of murder. Some of the testi-
mony concerned the wealth of the murdered victim. The appellate
court ruled that the .trial court's instruction unduly focused atten-
tion upon the defendant's interest in the result of the case. It was
pointed out that this instruction, coupled with an emphasis by the
trial judge on defendant's interest in the wealth of the decedent,
had prejudiced the jury beyond repair. Since the credibility of the
defendant was to be tested by both his interest as a defendant
and his interest as an heir of decedent, the prejudice in this case
becomes obvious.
The modern trend is toward the acceptance of the minority
rule. A good example of this trend is the recent case of State v.
Bester.71 In this case, the Supreme Court of Iowa overturned a
66. Id. at 138, 413 P.2d at 504.
67. NEv. REV. STAT. § 175.170 (1955).
68. The court felt that the thrust of the constitutional mandate that
judges shall not charge juries in respect to matters of fact includes in its
scope the matter of credibility of witnesses.
69. 82 Nev. at 139, 413 P.2d at 505: "No one would suggest that a
judge should be allowed to instruct the jury that a defendant in a
criminal case, who has testified on his own behalf, is a liar and not to be
believed." But see State v. Witch, 65 Nev. 668, 200 P.2d 991 (1948). State
v. Williams, 47 Nev. 279, 220 P. 555 (1923). Both cases held such instruc-
tion constituted harmless error.
70. 191 So. 2d 830, 836 (Miss. 1966) (the accused was also an heir
of deceased).
71. Iowa , 167 N.W.2d 705 (1969); see State v. Evans,
long line of precedents in that jurisdiction.7 2 The defendant as-
signed the following instruction as error:
In considering and weighing his testimony you are not
required to receive the testimony as true, but to give it
full and careful consideration and determine whether it or
any part of it is true or false, and whether such testimony
is given by the defendant in good faith or for the purpose of
avoiding conviction. You may take into consideration his
interest in the outcome of this case as a person charged
with a crime .... 73
The defendant argued that comment of this nature violated the
fifth amendment and placed heavy reliance on the United States
Supreme Court decision in Griffin v. California,74 which held that
no adverse comment could be made on a defendant's failure to
testify. The Iowa court did not consider the constitutional issue.75
Instead the court attacked the problem as one affecting defendant's
right to a fair trial, and held that this instruction constituted rever-
sible error. Since the defendant had been singled out, his testi-
mony, which was of great importance, had been rendered ques-
tionable thus weakening his case. Reference was made to a case76
which stated that justice would be more surely accomplished if the
credibility of the defendant was left solely to the jury without spe-
cial instruction.
Thus, it can be seen that an instruction which singles out the
the defendant and his testimony has been a constant source of
problems. The modern tendency of the courts has been to dis-
courage the giving of such instructions. Although the majority
jurisdictions cling to the old entrenched rule, some courts seem to
be dissatisfied with the results of same. Courts which originally
held such instructions proper have begun to discourage their use.77
Since the present attitude of the courts seems to be in favor of
giving a defendant every conceivable safeguard, this problem will
probably be raised in many future appeals.
EVALUATION
It is submitted that the minority rule appears to be the better
rule. An instruction which specifically refers to the accused's
interest is prejudicial and should constitute reversible error. The
Iowa , 169 N.W. 200, 204 (1969) (the trial judge was instructed to be
guided by Bester).
72. See State v. Gibson, 228 Iowa 748, 754, 292 N.W. 786, 788 (1940);
State v. Parsons, 209 Iowa 540, 228 N.W. 307 (1930); State v. Brooks, 181
Iowa 874, 165 N.W. 194 (1917); State v. Case, 96 Iowa 264, 65 N.W. 149
(1895).
73. State v. Bester, Iowa ,167 N.W.2d 705 (1969).
74. 380 U.S. 605 (1965).
75. Iowa at , 167 N.W.2d at 706.
76. People v. VanEman, 111 Cal. 144, 43 P. 520 (1896).
77. E.g., Taylor v. United States, 390 F.2d 278, 284 (8th Cir. 1968);
State v. Bester, Iowa , 167 N.W.2d 705 (1969).
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defendant is entitled to testify as a competent witness, and
this privilege should not be abused by allowing adverse comment
by the trial judge.18  When the jury is instructed to consider the
accused's interest, as it might affect his credibility, the insinuation
is that he will not tell the truth.
When an accused elects to remain silent, neither the court nor
the prosecutor may comment on the fact that he has failed to
speak.79 However, if he does speak, the majority rule holds that his
testimony may be accorded singular comment.8 0 If it is unconstitu-
tional to comment on a defendant's failure to speak, it is submitted
that, when he does testify, an instruction which specifically burdens
his testimony is likewise unconstitutional.
When a defendant is singled out as a witness who has an in-
terest in the case, the instruction distinguishes his testimony from
that of other witnesses. It is possible that there are other wit-
nesses who have an interest in the result of the case. When the
trial judge calls the jury's attention to the defendant's interest,
he is subjecting the accused's testimony to a standard of credibility
different from the other witnesses who have testified. The defend-
ant should be entitled to have his testimony weighed in the same
manner as the other witnesses, free from any type of prejudicial
remarks.
A cogent argument is raised by the jurisdictions which require
the defendant's testimony to be treated in the same manner as
other witnesses. 81 These courts consider it the task of the jury to
determine the credibility of witnesses, including the defendant
when he elects to testify. The judge is required to instruct the
jury as to the law, and the jury is to decide the facts. The ma-
jority of jurisdictions appear to allow a special instruction con-
cerning defendant's interest to insure that the jury is fully in-
structed as to the issue of the defendant's credibility. There is a
fear that the jurors will not consider the defendant's special in-
terest in the case. There appears to be little justification for such
fear. The jurors are well aware of defendant's interest in the
case, and they do not have to be reminded of it.8 2
Some courts have held that the giving of such instruction is
78. Hinton v. People, Colo. , 458 P.2d 611, 615 (1969) (the
court recognized the instruction was erroneous, but refused to hold it re-
versible error).
79. Griffin v. United States, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
80. State v. Ford, 259 Iowa 744, 750, 145 N.W. 638, 644 (1962).
81. See discussion at note 58 and accompanying text supra.
82. Buckley v. State, 62 Miss. 705 (1885).
harmless error It should be recognized that the jury is apt to
give great weight to the trial judge's instructions. When the in-
struction refers to the defendant's interest, and this interest is em-
phasized by a singular comment by the trial judge, the jury
may interpret the instruction to mean that the defendant's testi-
mony should be weighed by a standard differing from that applica-
ble to other witnesses. The jury may thus have a tendency to dis-
believe the accused merely because he is the accused.
It is submitted that a special instruction on the defendant's
interest in the outcome gives the state an undue advantage. The
accused is placed in a position where his testimony becomes an
issue in itself. The defendant's testimony is rendered valueless,
and his case is thus weakened.8 3 The instruction serves no useful
purpose because the jurors are obviously aware of defendant's in-
terest in the case. The only result of this type of instruction is to
leave defendant's counsel with a troubled mind. 4 The defendant,
therefore, feeling that the reference to his interest has deprived him
of a fair trial is apt to appeal his case to a higher court, claiming
the trial judge had prejudiced his case by the giving of such er-
roneous instructions.
The more modern and better procedure appears to be to give
but one instruction on the credibility of all witnesses.8 5 In this
way the defendant will not be singled out, and he will not be
able to claim that his testimony has been prejudiced. Since his
credibility would be judged according to the same standards as
other witnesses, the jury would still be able to weigh his interest
in the case and find accordingly. The jury would not be misled
because the interest of the accused is obvious. A single instruction
which would include a general reference to the defendant would
sharply reduce the number of appeals based on erroneous instruc-
tions concerning the defendant's interest in the case. An accused is
entitled to a fair trial. Since he has been given the right to testify
on his own behalf, his testimony should not be nullified by adverse
comment of the trial judge. The best solution would therefore be
to render the giving of special instructions on defendant's interest
in the case reversible error. In this way the testimony of the ac-
cused can be properly weighed by the jury and no prejudice will
result to the accused.
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83. Taylor v. United States, 390 F.2d 278, 283 (8th Cir. 1968).
84. Id. at 284.
85. Id. at 285.
